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This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent
research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection,
and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral
control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments
(e.g., Wegner, 2003; Harris, 2012) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious
control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together,
these findings can also support an alternative conception of free will. The constructive
nature of memory and an integrative “default network” provide the means for novel and
creative combinations of information, such as the imagining of counterfactual scenarios
and alternative courses of action. Considering recent findings of extensive functional
connections between these systems and those that subsume motor control and goal
maintenance, it is argued that individuals have the capability of producing novel ideas
and translating them into actionable goals. Although most of these processes take place
beneath conscious awareness, it is argued that they are unique to the individual and thus,
can be considered a form of independent control over behavior, or free will.
Keywords: free will, prospection, motor control, default network, volition, planned behavior, conscious experience
An identifying characteristic of human experience is a distinct,
intuitive sense of volition. An inner voice existing within each
of us insists that our actions result from personal will, telling
us that we consciously choose our actions and rationally guide
ourselves through life. Although intuitively satisfying, this notion
has, deservedly, been the subject of much debate over the years.
Recently, as neuroscience and psychology have expanded our
understanding of themind, a number of eminent scholars in these
fields have provided evidence that contradicts such intuitive con-
ceptions (e.g., Libet, 1985; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002) leading
some to argue that the notion of free will should be discarded
entirely (e.g., Harris, 2012). Here I will argue that, although
recent evidence does justify rejecting the idea that humans possess
entirely conscious, reasoned self-control; if one moves away from
simplistic notions of consciousness and its role in human decision
making, findings from several areas, when taken together, suggest
an alternative conception of free will: Humans can possess levels
of autonomy even if the processes involved are not entirely accessi-
ble to conscious reason. This argument consists of several major
components: In sections The Problem with Memory: Looking
Backwards or Forwards? through Novel Conceptions I review evi-
dence from multiple lines of research for novelty or creativity
in human thought. Sections The Problem with Conscious Will
and Why Consciousness? discuss findings regarding the limita-
tions of conscious awareness as well as its potential value. Sections
Internal Control of Behavior and Translating Simulations into
Goals present evidence for the internal control of behavior as well
as for functional connections between this control system and
the systems involved with creative processing and counter-factual
thinking. Finally, in sections Modeling Volitional Processes and
Free Will with Limited Consciousness Awareness, I suggest a
model for understanding how these systems interact and a more
practically defensible model of free will: The creative integration
of conceptual elements into novel, counter-factual simulations,
and the use of these generative processes to guide behavior.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The terms free will and consciousness both mean many things to
many different people. For this reason it is important to first clar-
ify some of the underlying assumptions that drive this argument.
After establishing the gist of how these terms are used, as well as
the intention of this paper, the line of thinking that follows should
be clearer.
WHAT IS MEANT BY FREE WILL?
This paper is notmeant as a philosophical treatise. As such, it does
not address the more metaphysical issues, such as determinism,
often invoked in free will debates. The point of this discussion is to
present psychological evidence pointing to the possibility of indi-
vidual humans behaving in novel and creative ways, albeit within
the constraints of whatever context they live in. The human brain,
it is presumed, can only process information that it is exposed to.
The argument here is that human brain functions allow for given
sets of information to be combined in novel or creative ways, and
furthermore, the integrative conceptions created through these
processes can be used to direct action.
Another point is that, although philosophers have significantly
more nuanced ways of understanding the term, psychologists
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tend to operationalize free will by relating it to self-report (e.g.,
Libet et al., 1983; Wegner, 2008) which requires a form of
self-reflective conscious awareness. The implicit condition is that
one must be able to report upon all the processes leading up to
a decision or behavior in order for it to be “free,” and conversely,
if my brain generates an idea or initiates an action without my
conscious awareness it is somehow not “me” doing the think-
ing or acting. The conception of freedom argued for here, on the
other hand, merely requires that thoughts and resulting actions
be novel and internally generated, that they result from a combi-
nation of experiences and characteristics which is unique to the
individual. Unconscious, or implicit, processes are, in this view,
essential components of how an individual processes informa-
tion: Regardless of whether a particular process can be observed
and narrated by the conscious, self-aware part of the brain, it can
still make unique and important contributions toward thought
and action, and thus, to the independence of the individual. The
arguments here, thus, specifically reject the simplistic notion that free
will requires complete conscious awareness of the processes involved.
WHAT IS MEANT BY CONSCIOUSNESS?
A separate, but closely related point should also be made about
the term “consciousness” which is used rather haphazardly by
both scientists and laypersons to refer to a range of different phe-
nomena (Chalmers, 1995). A basic conception of consciousness
is experiential awareness or alertness, which is defined in contrast
to unconsciousness (e.g., being awake as opposed to being in a
deep sleep or a coma). Consciousness, from this viewpoint, can
exist on many levels and possess varying degrees of complexity,
all of which are simply characterized by the presence of subjec-
tive or phenomenal experience (Velmans, 2009). For example,
every person experiences many degrees of alertness, a variety of
emotions, as well as many other subjective phenomena over the
course of a given day. There is no one conscious state that can
be defined, there are rather, many overlapping, but differentiable
states, some simple and some quite complex; some describable
and some inscrutable. By this definition, although their subjec-
tive “experience” would vary tremendously (see, for example,
Nagel, 1974) most forms of animal life as well as very small chil-
dren would possess consciousness in some form. Tononi’s (2008)
conceptualization of consciousness as integrated information is
suggestive in this regard. By contrast, studies that are commonly
cited as evidence against conscious free will (e.g., Libet et al., 1983;
Wegner, 2003) tend to operationalize consciousness as an aware-
ness of mental processes which is measured through self-report:
Participants are asked to describe aspects of their experience after
performing certain tasks. It should be obvious that, although they
are often conflated, these conceptions of consciousness are far
from equivalent. The latter is more accurately a form of metacog-
nition (i.e., “thinking about thought”), or self-consciousness,
which is a small, so far as we know distinctively human, subset of
the former (e.g., Rochat, 2003). Nevertheless, since in most dis-
cussions of free will, the term consciousness refers to this type of
narrative self-awareness it is used here in the same way, although
it is with the assumption that the individual experiences and
interacts with his surroundings on multiple levels, only some of
which are accessible to conscious self-report (e.g., Morin, 2006).
For the purpose of this discussion, internal processes belong to
the individual regardless of where they fall on any continuum of
consciousness to unconsciousness.
MEMORY, PROSPECTION, AND CREATIVITY
Several areas of research have recently converged on a concep-
tion of memory as constructive, with the ability to combine
elements of different remembered events in an integrative fash-
ion. Evidence for processes that extract and recombine elements
of multiple representations in generative, potentially novel, ways
is discussed throughout the next six sections.
THE PROBLEMWITH MEMORY: LOOKING BACKWARDS OR
FORWARDS?
Research has, over the years, pointed toward inaccuracies in the
functioning of human memory (e.g., Schacter, 1999; Moscovitch
et al., 2006; Addis et al., 2007). Remembering, it has been shown,
is more of a creative, constructive process than the precise recall
of past events. People, for example, often remember things that
never happened (Roediger and McDermott, 1995), and conflate
different episodes with each other, combining bits and pieces
of various events into a single recalled instance (e.g., Tulving,
2002; Schacter and Addis, 2007a). Similarly, memories for specific
events apparently change with each recollection, often incorpo-
rating current information with past impressions (Bridge and
Paller, 2012). Having experienced problems stemming from such
inaccuracies, it is not surprising that most people interpret such
inaccuracies as “bugs,” or errors, in a memory system which
should, intuitively, provide accurate information about the past.
Recent interpretations of such phenomena, however, (Dudai
and Carruthers, 2005; Schacter and Addis, 2007b) speculate that
the lack of factual accuracy in our recollections may instead be
the signature of a system that evolved, not to store accurate repre-
sentations of the past, but instead, to provide a means of flexibly
imagining the future, as well as conceiving of other hypotheti-
cal scenarios. Surviving in the real world does not depend upon
accurate recall of every past detail as much as an ability to pre-
dict future contingencies (Schacter et al., 2008). A system that
can integrate details of multiple past events and is more sen-
sitive to broad patterns and associations rather than accurately
representing minutia would be well suited to this purpose.
The idea that memory systems play an important role in the
creation of counter-factual scenarios, or formulating mental sim-
ulations, is supported by findings from several areas. Neurological
studies find considerable overlap of brain systems used in mem-
ory and simulation (e.g., Buckner, 2010). Research on Construal
Level Theory (Trope and Liberman, 2010) has identified similar
patterns in how we conceptualize the past and the future. Also,
studies of prospection, or predicting the future (Gilbert, 2006;
Gilbert andWilson, 2007), demonstrate that emotions and mem-
ory play an important role in imagining the future. These points
are briefly reviewed in the following sections.
NEUROBIOLOGY OF MEMORY AND PROSPECTION
Patients with memory deficits have, for some time, been observed
to have difficulty planning for and imagining the future (Tulving
et al., 1988; Hassabis et al., 2007). This led to some early
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speculation about a relationship between memory and prospec-
tion (e.g., Fuster, 1989) which has only recently been confirmed
by functional imaging studies (Addis et al., 2009). Growing evi-
dence points to a core network of brain regions involved in
remembering the past and imagining the future, as well as other
forms of mental simulation (Arzy et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady,
2010). In broad terms, tasks related to “mental time travel” (i.e.,
remembering the past and predicting the future) incorporate
memory systems in the medial temporal lobes, the lateral pari-
etal lobes and the hippocampal formation (Wheeler and Buckner,
2004), in addition to areas in the medial frontal lobes which are
involved in perspective taking and theory of mind, or under-
standing others’ mental states (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). It
seems that many forms of self-projection; imagining the past and
future, navigation (imagining the self in different physical loca-
tions) and theory of mind (taking the perspective of other people)
depend on this same core network of memory-related brain areas
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007).
THE DEFAULT NETWORK: INTEGRATING INFORMATIONWHILE AT REST
Particularly relevant for this discussion are findings (e.g., Buckner
et al., 2008) noting increased activity in this core network of brain
regions during periods of undirected mental function, or passive
states—hence its common designation as the “default network.”
This default network is broadly associated with many forms of
stimulus-independent thinking or internally focused cognition
(Spreng and Grady, 2010): Mind-wandering, daydreaming, imag-
ining the future, reminiscing about the past, as well as thinking
about the cognitive states of others are all subsumed within
its functions (e.g., Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al.,
2008). When the brain is not occupied with processing exter-
nal stimuli, activity reverts to this area where stored impressions
are consolidated and reorganized (Buckner, 2010). The default
network seems to facilitate the internal experience of scenarios
and perspectives that transcend simple recall, and it seems to
do so automatically through making connections between, or
recombining, elements of multiple memory traces.
ABSTRACTION AND THE EXTRACTION OF GIST ELEMENTS
Evidence of how this reworking of stored memories operates
can be seen in Trope and Liberman’s (2010) research on mental
representations (summarized as Construal Level Theory). They
have shown that mental representations of objects and experi-
ence become reconstructed in different ways at various levels of
abstraction. “Psychological distance,” for example spatial, tempo-
ral, or social separation, between a person and an object leads to
representations of differing resolution. Objects, people, and situ-
ations that are imagined to be distant are represented with less
resolution; their conceptions become more abstract and essen-
tialized (Liberman et al., 2002). A chair, for example, could be
imagined as a specific object one is sitting on now, or imagin-
ing various future or past scenarios representations can take on
numerous forms. For example, imagining a chair in an office, a
living room, a restaurant, a car, or a spaceship can result in many
different images. All that remains constant is the essential quality
of affording sitting (see Gibson, 1977). The mind changes how it
represents objects based upon the imagined context (e.g., Smith,
1998), adding or removing non-essential elements to facilitate
the formation of a sensible scene. Complementing the research
on memory and the default network, Construal Level Theory
illustrates how gist elements from numerous impressions can be
combined to create mental simulations placing the self and others
in various situations and contexts (Wakslak et al., 2008).
EMOTIONS, MEMORY, AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
Similarly, the integration and fuzzy processing that seems to occur
in the default network is evident in Gilbert’s (2006) writings about
prospection. Emotional aspects of memories and current states
influence mental simulations in important ways. Current emo-
tional states, for example, color our emotional feelings about
future events (Gilbert andWilson, 2007); so, for example, if we are
in a good mood when imagining a future date we are more likely
to imagine it going well. Also, as memories tend to be skewed
toward emotional peaks and valleys (Morewedge et al., 2005);
simulations become “over emotionalized.” They tend to focus on
brief highlights (or lowlights): Thinking about a future trip to an
amusement park, for example, we might just remember the thrill
of riding a roller coaster, and the pleasure of eating ice cream from
past visits; not so much the monotony of waiting in long lines.
Gilbert (2006) also points out that memories and predic-
tions of the future are strongly influenced by cultural scripts or
“memes” (e.g., Blackmore, 2000; Bonn and Tafarodi, 2013). Our
memories of the past, as well as imaginings of the future, are
given meaning and form by the narratives that predominate in
our cultures. The stories that we observe and hear being told
from day-to-day shape our expectations and evaluations of our
own lives, leading us to reshape the way we remember experi-
ences over time (Klaaren et al., 1994). Memories (and in turn
our expectations about the future) get rewritten each time they
are accessed. Thus, over time the way we remember our past and
what we expect in the future tends to fall in line with the narrative
zeitgeist.
NOVEL CONCEPTIONS
Evidence, thus, supports the notion that as processing becomes
removed from current surroundings representations change in
nature: Details fall away while meaning, feelings, and connect-
ing relationships become more important. Elements of different
scenarios, when stripped of context, mingle with one another,
potentially combining in ways many steps removed from actual
experience.
Regardless of where such connections appear on a spectrum of
conscious awareness, the integrative systems that seem to center
around the default network allow for a great deal of flexibil-
ity in imagining and simulating possible realities. Although such
simulations can be deeply flawed in the sense of being factually
inaccurate and susceptible to bias, they are unique to the indi-
vidual in that they are based upon that person’s specific set of
experiences. Each mind has a specific store of knowledge to which
it can “add value” by integrating that information in qualitatively
new ways (e.g., Tononi, 2008). New formulations of knowledge,
in theory, can subsequently be fed back into the processing sys-
tem and form the bases for new phantasies (e.g., Kashima et al.,
2007). Simulations thus, have the potential to build upon each
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other through a process of scaffolding, feeding back into memory
and integrating with each other iteratively over time.
Buckner (2010) actually takes the potential for originality one
step further by arguing that, not only can we extract and com-
bine elemental properties of information in creative ways, but
random variations in neural firings would almost certainly play
a part in the flexibility of this sort of system. He observes that
seemingly random properties of neural systems are observable in
nature. Aronov et al. (2008), for example, has identified a spe-
cific brain structure in finches that seems to relate to random song
patterns. Cisek and Kalaska (2005) observed apparently random
variations in neural firing influencing behavioral choice in mon-
keys. Relatedly, Bim (2012) has noted that physiological noise,
such as respiratory and cardiac fluctuations, can influence rest-
ing functional connectivity in the brain. Thus, intrinsic properties
of neural systems combined with environmental variation could
allow for novel leaps in connectivity or new combinatorial pat-
terns. Again, this is not an argument for conscious control over
how the mind produces concepts, but for a capacity of originality,
generativity, or creativity, in how it processes information.
CONSCIOUSNESS: LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES
THE PROBLEMWITH CONSCIOUS WILL
The studies most commonly cited in neuropsychological argu-
ments against the existence of free will began with a series of
experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues
(1983; 1985). Libet showed that readiness potentials or neural
indications of an impulse to act were evident in participants’
brains well before they reported any conscious intention to act.
The conscious awareness of an intention to act in these experi-
ments apparently came into being several 100ms after the action
had been set in motion within the brain. More recently, func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging studies (e.g., Soon et al., 2008)
have detected neural correlates of an intention to act many sec-
onds before conscious awareness of that intention is reported.
Conscious awareness of an impulse to act, thus, seems to be a
neurological afterthought to the impulse itself.
Along similar lines, Wegner (2003) has collected extensive evi-
dence indicating that, in many cases, our experience of conscious
will is misleading. In some cases the feeling of causing or of will-
ing an action does not exist after we have performed it (e.g.,
Geschwind et al., 1995) and in other cases we can be led to believe
that we caused an action that we, in fact, did not (Ansfield and
Wegner, 1996; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). Wegner theorizes
that the sense of having willed an action is inferred from various
indicators: If we think a thought just prior to an action; the action
is consistent with our thought; and there is no other obvious cause
of the action; then, we tend to infer that we performed the action
(Wegner, 2003). Even more, once we have inferred responsibility
for an action we tend to rewrite our perceptions so that they are
more consistent with this sense of authorship. Evidence shows, for
example, that we estimate the gap between thought and action to
be smaller for actions that we believe we have willed and longer for
actions we do not feel responsible for (Ebert and Wegner, 2011).
Again, the gist of these findings is that our feeling of having con-
sciously willed an act is illusory in many ways. It seems that the
conscious awareness of intention that we place so much weight
upon, that we naively think of as causal, is, in fact, a narrative
construction that is formed well after the train of causation has
been set in motion.
What Wegner, Libet, and others have shown clearly is that the
narrative awareness of a will to act arises after the actual impulse
to perform a certain action. This does not mean, however, that
the action is not owned by the person. It merely shows that action
is not initiated by the narrative self. Only if our definition of the
self is limited to narrative capability can we say that the person
didn’t initiate the action. One must acknowledge, based on the
evidence, that the stories we create about our actions are mislead-
ing. They are subjective impressions, not factual accounts of all
the processes involved. The argument can still be made, however,
that the individual (i.e., the person in the broader, not necessarily
self-conscious, sense) may initiate or control behavior on other,
less explicit, levels.
WHY CONSCIOUSNESS?
Libet (1999) himself pointed out that even if the conscious
impression of will is merely corollary to and not the direct cause of
an action it still occurs enough in advance of the action to allow
for a conscious “veto” or a decision to not perform the action.
Such late inhibitory decisions apparently involve an area in the
frontomedian cortex (Brass and Haggard, 2007) and involve per-
ceptual feedback (Moore et al., 2009). Consciousness, in this way,
seems to have the potential to play some role in self-monitoring
processes (Kuhn and Brass, 2009). Although we are not con-
sciously aware of what is going on at every stage of the chain
of neural events leading to action, there is room for a degree of
conscious involvement if only to pull the emergency brake before
it is too late. Thus, although it may not be the initial source of
motivations and behavioral impulses, the part of the mind that
is self-reflective; that can envision the self in causal and narrative
contexts, may serve important monitoring and control functions.
Even Wegner, who has tirelessly argued that the folk under-
standing of conscious will is an illusion, has suggested that such
an illusion probably serves some social purpose (Wegner, 2008).
Being able to observe our behavior and its results in context,
he suggests, allows individuals to better fit into complex social
arrangements. Although illusory, the perspective of agency allows
the brain to fine tune its behavioral impulses. “It tells us what
we can and cannot do (Wegner, 2008; p. 241),” and further, the
illusion of conscious will “makes behavior more open to mod-
ification (Wegner, 2008; p. 243).” So, for Wegner, the fact that
conscious will is largely illusory does not completely rule out
self-reflective capabilities from having some effect on behavior.
Consciousness may play an important role in monitoring the
self and its behavior within contexts. Consciousness, in the sense
of self-reflection, is closely entwined with the creation of narrative
meaning (McAdams, 2008). Narrative meaning making involves
processes such as conceptualizing the self in relation to higher-
order or longer-term goals and social rules as well as imagining
the consequences of actions and the reactions of others to those
actions. This is all critical to understanding how the self relates
to the surrounding world, and especially to integrating behav-
ior with complex social contexts (Cozolino, 2002; Baumeister,
2008; Rochat, 2009). A monitoring function for the conscious self
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would, in theory, track behavioral impulses and their potential
results, looking for conflicts between the actor and his longer term
goals as they arise, with the potential for triggering inhibitory
functions at various times. Consciousness, in this view, influences
behavior by providing broad contextual input and inhibitory
feedback into a complex planning system. Behavioral impulses,
however, would be produced by mechanisms that are outside
of direct conscious control. Consciousness per se is most use-
ful because it can monitor behaviors, goals, and the changing
environment in real-time watching for potential conflicts. The
bulk of processing, however, must take place in other complex
systems that operate largely beneath the surface. Consciousness
seems most important for providing up-to-the-minute contex-
tual integration and feedback to other systems. Self-reflective
monitoring facilitates the fine-tuning of impulses and behaviors,
and inhibitory control, necessary for high-level integration with
dynamic physical and social environments.
CONTROL AND PLANNING OF BEHAVIOR
Strictly conscious control over behavior seems to be ruled out
by our improved understanding of the mind. Does this mean,
however, that a person is not in control of their behavior? Again,
keeping in mind a broad definition of the “person” as including
both conscious and unconscious elements, recent discoveries can
shed light on this issue. First, there is a separatemotor control net-
work dedicated to internally generated, voluntary, goal oriented
behaviors as contrasted with externally-triggered andmore habit-
ual behaviors. Second, there appear to be connections between the
default network, where novel ideas and counterfactual scenarios
are produced, and this goal-oriented control network that allows
for the internal generation of action.
INTERNAL CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR
Two major sources provide activating input to the primary motor
cortex, which is the initiator of muscle movement (Haggard,
2008). The first motor control system runs from the sensory cor-
tices to the primary motor region via the pre-motor area: Activity
in these areas relates to stimulus-driven, or reflexive, responses to
sensory input as well as to habitual behaviors such as grasping,
eating, and walking which are performed largely unconsciously
(Prabhu et al., 2007). The second motor system involves mul-
tiple regions, including the cingulate, frontal cortices, and basal
ganglia, which connect to the primary motor cortex via the pre-
supplementary and supplementary motor areas. Behaviors that
require planning and goal maintenance engage some or all of
this system (Daw et al., 2006; Hirosaka, 2008). Processes medi-
ated by pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) connections
generally allow for the flexible, online integration of goal states,
decisions, and action priorities with feedback from the environ-
ment. Imaging studies, for example, show that the preSMA is
consistently involved in task-focused activities and situations that
require the preferential selection of certain behaviors over others
(Nachev et al., 2007). Importantly, patients with damage to the
preSMA are deficient in their ability to prioritize behaviors and
suppress automatic behaviors (Pacherie, 2007): They might, for
example, impulsively grasp, eat, or drink without reporting the
intention or desire to do so (Della Salla et al., 1991), suggesting
that the preSMA plays a role in inhibiting the habitual behaviors
governed by the first motor control system.
This second motor control system plays a crucial role in tasks
related to goals and decision making. The preSMA, along with
the frontopolar cortex and the rostral cingulate, is active in tasks
requiring decisions between multiple options, such as choosing
between right or left hand key presses (Ammon and Gandevia,
2007; Mueller et al., 2007). The frontopolar cortex is also involved
inmaintaining goal states such as suppressing responses to imme-
diate environmental demands (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Dreher
et al., 2008) and, along with the anterior cingulate (ACC), is
seemingly involved in the production of goal-directed action
sequences (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012). The ACC, through the
preSMA, also seems capable of selecting and initiating action
in the absence of external prompts, as well as monitoring and
adjusting those actions in response to feedback (Rowe et al., 2010;
Zhang et al., 2012). All told, there are extensive findings indicat-
ing that the preSMA is involved in interfacing multiple goal and
decision-related subsystems with the primary motor cortex.
Most complex behaviors would involve an integration of these
two motor systems, with the more automatic system triggering
the basic movements and the decision and goal related sys-
tem throwing in guidance and inhibitory impulses at important
junctures. Although these relationships need further clarifica-
tion, the pathways mediated by the supplementary and pre-
supplementary motor areas do seem to allow for basic internally
guided choice, selective inhibition, and “volition-like” control
of behavior (Haggard, 2008), though probably not complex
decision-making or reasoning (e.g., Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007).
The next section will propose that these systems are capable of
interfacing with the default network during planning tasks. In
this way, output from integrative processes taking place in the
default network could be incorporated into goal formation and
behavioral control.
TRANSLATING SIMULATIONS INTO GOALS
To this point we have established two important concepts. First,
processing in the default network allows humans to create novel
combinations of information. Information stored in memory is
broken down to elemental form and connections made between
elements during times of reduced sensory input. This allows for
patterns and relationships among multiple impressions to be
extracted and for the flexible generation of counterfactual sim-
ulations. Second, faculties exist for internally maintained goals to
exert flexible control over behavior. Humans can replace auto-
matic, reflexive behaviors with internally guided, goal-directed
action.
Default network functioning, by definition, is most active
when the external attention necessary for goal-oriented function-
ing is absent. Thus, the systems that produce novel ideas and those
that maintain goals are usually thought of as contradictory, or
negatively correlated (e.g., Fox et al., 2005; Carhart-Harris and
Friston, 2010). Free will as it is conceptualized here, however,
would require an interface between these two levels of operations.
For behaviors to be called free, or independently generated, they
would need to result not just from the complex training processes
that reside within the goal maintenance system: They would need
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to incorporate elements that are unique to the individual; that
are novel and creative, as well. The brain would need to be able
to translate the abstract simulations and integrated information
produced by the default network into actionable goals.
Recently, Spreng et al. (2010) found that tasks in which partic-
ipants made goal-related plans activated default network regions
as well as regions commonly associated with cognitive con-
trol (i.e., areas of the frontal cortex and the ACC). Similarly,
other recent studies (Gerlach et al., 2011; Spreng and Schacter,
2012) have found that solving imagined future problems involved
default network areas as well as control network areas. In par-
ticular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is central to
rule acquisition and goal maintenance functions (Badre and
D’Esposito, 2009; Badre et al., 2009; Packer and Cunningham,
2009) has been implicated, along with default network regions,
in planning tasks. Gerlach et al. (2011) have also found func-
tional connections between the posterior cingulate cortex, which
is thought to be the nexus of the default network, and the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex. The default network, then, is seemingly
able to interface with goal maintenance and cognitive control
functions when engaged in problem solving and future planning.
This suggests that the generative capacity of the default network;
the ability to extract elements of diverse memories and impres-




Thus, although the folk conception of free will as entirely con-
scious self-control seems to be dead in the water (e.g., Wegner,
2008; Harris, 2012), I have argued here for a broader concep-
tion of free will which is compatible with current neuroscientific
understanding. This model is broadly outlined in Figure 1:
Essentially, according to this model, the individual can gen-
erate novel concepts, translate those concepts into goals, and
initiate and monitor activity toward achieving those goals. The
model consists of two feedback loops which are largely anti-
correlated. The first loop is made up of the default network
and memory systems: The default network extracts elements of
stored information from memory systems, integrates and com-
bines information in various ways, and feeds the results back
into memory. The second loop involves the executive control and
motor networks: Executive regions establish and update goal pri-
orities, while initiating andmonitoringmotor activities according
to environmental feedback. These two loops are linked via a feed
forward connection from the default network to the executive
control network (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2011) which allows for out-
put from simulations occurring within the default network to
be uploaded into the executive control network and incorpo-
rated into the creation and maintenance of externally directed
goals. Additional information is continually fed back into the
memory and control systems through sensory input from the
environment. Each person’s activities lead through their observed
effect on the environment to a unique store of information in
the individual memory system. The many impressions; sensory,
emotional, or otherwise, that the individual has in memory are
available to the default network during times of reduced input.
During such periods, elements or traces of different memories are
combined together in various ways with the results then stored
and available for further processing.
Both loops are accessible to a limited degree by conscious
awareness or self-reflective abilities and receive some feed-
back from this conscious level. Conscious awareness is mostly












































FIGURE 1 | Model showing interconnections among systems for memory, mental simulations, behavioral control, and conscious awareness.
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current contextual information. Althoughmost processing occurs
beneath conscious awareness, the ability to direct attention both
inwards and outwards could make conscious awareness especially
useful for monitoring and minimizing conflicts between actions,
intentions, and real-time, current context. In the case of the
control/motor network loop, conscious awareness also possesses
some veto-like inhibitory powers: It can interfere with certain
impulses before action is initiated (e.g., Libet, 1999). In the con-
text of the default network, conscious monitoring could integrate
current contextual information with ongoing simulations, per-
haps providing reality checking functions which keep simulations
more in line with the external environment. In both systems con-
scious awareness need not be directly causal, but just provide
monitoring and additional real time information as feedback into
the system.
Though preliminary, this model provides an outline of how
a practical form of free will, independently generated and con-
trolled activity, can exist and be consistent with current findings
from psychology and neuroscience. Those who adhere to par-
ticular definitions of “free will” could certainly take issue with
these arguments. However, if one accepts that free will can exist
in degrees limited by a person’s knowledge and experiences; and,
that decisions do not need to be entirely conscious in order to be
owned by the individual. Then, I believe there is evidence to posit
a level of will and independence within the person. Individuals
can integrate information creatively to conceptualize multiple dif-
ferent scenarios or goals; they can choose between options; they
can act according to goals; they can abort actions if they do not
match current goal sets; and they can incorporate and integrate
information from ongoing feedback into subsequent simulations
and decisions.
FREE WILL WITH LIMITED CONSCIOUSNESS AWARENESS
As I have discussed, the role that consciousness, as it is commonly
conceptualized, plays in these processes is limited. It is not, how-
ever, non-existent. There is a place in this model for conscious
monitoring of simulations and goal states, the integration of sen-
sory information with ongoing internal processes, and related
inhibitory control. The vast majority of processing in this model
does, however, take place beneath the level of conscious awareness
and self-report. If one considers the degree to which unconscious
processes are involved in every action that we undertake, this
should become far less of a concern. For example, consider every-
day acts like walking from one place to another, or speaking a
sentence. These are incredibly complex behaviors requiring the
coordinated operations of many thousands of neurons and mus-
cles simultaneously. When we perform such acts we are not aware
of exactly how we balance our bodies or shape our mouth and
tongue at any particular moment. Our bodies just perform as we
expect them to (normally) and we report via our conscious aware-
ness a summary of what we did or what we intended to do: We
just think “I walked to the café and ordered a coffee,” for example.
We don’t notice exactly how every muscle moved along the way,
where we placed our feet, or howwe formed our words.Most peo-
ple, however, would not claim a lack of control over their bodies.
It is not irrational to believe that, yes; I took a walk and ordered
coffee.
Cognitive psychology has shown over the years that large
portions of mental processing take place beneath the level of con-
sciousness awareness (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Kihlstrom, 2013).
Much of our mental processing involves energy- and time-saving
shortcuts, and much of our behavior is, for similar reasons, habit-
ual. This does not necessarily mean, however, that consciousness
is entirely left out of the picture, but certainly the conception that
we are in complete conscious control (or that we always behave
rationally) has been proven to be illusory.What I have argued here
is that if we abandon the ideas that human will needs to be com-
pletely explicit, and that conscious awareness and control of every
process is required for an individual to be a decision maker, it is
possible to see evidence of originality, individuality, and creative
processes, as well as cognitive control, in the way that each person
thinks and behaves. This type of individuality, I believe, can be
called free will.
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